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In this paper we provide a detailed description of the methodological steps involved in conducting a Service 
Design study in combination with Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs). It complements the conceptual and 
epistemological argument developed for this methodological combination in Osborne et al. (2021, World 
Development, in review WD-19535). Service Design for the co-creative development of policy interventions in 
complex adaptive systems involves an iterative process of moving between the six methodological stages of (1) 
problem co-definition, (2) actor-centred mapping, (3) experience-based problem diagnosis, (4) rapid prototyping, 
(5) design and testing and (6) upscaling. We suggest using DCEs as a quantitative method that is contextually 
adaptable and comparatively fast and cheap to implement, as part of stage (6) design and testing. Whilst both 
methods can operate independently with their own strengths and limitations, we find their combination to add 
value to the processes and outcomes of each. We illustrate the general methodological approach with a step-by-





 Service Design co-creatively develops well-targeted solutions in complex adaptive systems 
 Discrete Choice Experiments quantitatively elicit actors’ preferences over the design of goods or services  
 Their combination can bring deeply contextualised, user-centred, operational and experimentally verified 
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Successful interventions that require behavioural change in complex adaptive systems must 
embrace non-linearity and complex system dynamics. Thus, interventions in a development context 
should be designed using a highly iterative process incorporating feedback loops and opportunities 
for evaluation and redesign throughout the process. This paper illustrates the methodological 
application of a conceptual framework described in Lambe et al. (2020a) that combines behavioural 
insights, service design theory and social-ecological systems thinking. The application illustrates that 
by combining qualitative methods derived from Service Design, with quantitative validation, in this 
example Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs), it is possible to provide fine-grained, verified and 
locally relevant insights that can be transformed and incorporated into scalable and effective 
development interventions and development programmes. This paper is to accompany the 
conceptual and epistemological argument for combining Service Design methodology with Discrete 
Choice Experiments made by Osborne et al. (2021, World Development, in review WD-19535) as its 
methodological counterpart. It does so by presenting the methodological steps involved in a case 
study on Weather Index Insurance (WII) in eastern Uganda.  
The framework by Lambe et al. (2020a) follows six consecutive steps with built in iterations between 
each stage, (1) problem co-definition, (2) actor-centred mapping, (3) experience-based problem 
diagnosis, (4) rapid prototyping, (5) intervention/programme design and testing and (6) upscaling. 
The approach combines a range of methods, but at all times is co-creative, experience-based, and 
actor centred (Adner 2012). It adopts a ‘wide lens’ innovation perspective from the start of the 
intervention design process and incorporates elements of verification at each step (Table 1).  
The methodology aims to map the decision-making landscape of actors in a complex adaptive system 
where a development programme is operating, or a development intervention is being introduced. 
This includes mapping the landscape and identifying key actors along the ‘user journey’ for the main 
actor. When this landscape has been thoroughly mapped and understood, prototype interventions 
can be co-designed with stakeholders and tested in-situ in order to inform the final intervention(s). In 
this paper, we particularly demonstrate how the testing stage can be achieved through the 
implementation of a Discrete Choice Experiment. To elucidate the practicalities of implementing the 
combined research approach, we first provide a generalised description of the six stages in the 
conceptual approach and suggest appropriate methodologies for each. We then describe how they 
operate over a project cycle, and finally illustrate how the approach can be applied in practice based 
on the empirical case-study example on designing Weather Index Insurance in eastern Uganda. 
 
Method details 
1. Service Design Methodology 
Service Design is a qualitative, actor centred approach that aims to understand actors‘ needs, wider 
context, motivation and behaviours and additionally aims to, in conjunction with the same actors, co-
develop and co-design improved services or systems that better meet the needs of the actors 
involved (Edvardsson et al., 2012; Manzini, 2015; Pfannstiel & Rasche, 2017). Service Design 
methodology has proven to be successful in identifying simple solutions to complex policy challenges 
that have shown to be difficult to resolve (Meroni, 2011).  Service Design can be seen as a set of tools 
as well as a methodology to address for example challenges in the public sector (Malmberg, 2017; 
4 
Bason, 2017; Escobar, 2017) and wicked problems in social systems (Banathy, 1996; Jones, 2014).  In 
particular, Service Design is useful to understand and map the interdependencies between actors, 
system components and multiple levels of a system (Sangiogri et al., 2017) 
The approach and application of the Lambe et al. (2020a) framework should be viewed as a 
combination of different methodological stages which build upon each other to deliver an overall 
objective. Rather than prescribing a rigid methodology in of itself to be stringently followed from the 
start to the end, it provides a scaffolding within which to move back and forth in various rounds of 
iteration. Depending on the overall objective, related research questions and the contextual setting, 
different methods can be used under each methodological step. In table 1 we summarise the 
methodological approach, including each stage’s objective, requirement for verification and potential 
methods, as well as the methods applied in the case study in Uganda.    
Table 1.  Methodological approach and suggested methods  
Conceptual framework 
stage  
Verification  Objective/Threshold  Methods  
Potential1 Applied in Uganda 
1  Problem co-definition  Desirable  Co-defined and clear 
understanding of 
objective  
Key Informant Interviews, Focus 
Group Discussions (Meso)2, Review 
of secondary data and relevant 
literature 
FGDs (Meso) (n=2) 
Key informant interview (n=1) 
Household survey (n=100) 
2  Actor-centred 
mapping  
Desirable  Map out the decision-
making landscape; 
identify and establish 
'boundary edges'. 
Participant Observation, Key 
Informant Interviews, Focus Group 
Discussions (Micro), Surveys, 
Transect walks 
Participatory Mapping: e.g. Time-
lining, Seasonal Calendars, 
Social/Actor Network Mapping, 
Market Systems Diagrams (MOSC), 
Ecosystem Service Mapping (TESSA)   
Participant Observation (n=20) 
In-depth interviews (n=12) 
FGDs (Micro) – incl. participatory 
mapping: time-lining, seasonal 
calendars, actor network and value 
chain mapping (n=7) 
3  Experience-based 
problem diagnosis  
Essential  Understand actors’ 
current behaviours and 




archetypes, aim for 
saturation. 
In-depth to targeted interviews with 
users, Key Informant Interviews, 
Focus Group Discussions 
(Micro/Meso),  
Participatory mapping: e.g. Actor 
Journey Mapping, Time-lining, 
Seasonal Calendars 
In-depth interviews (n=8) 
Targeted interviews – actor journey 
mapping (n=23) 
FGDs (Micro) – time-lining, seasonal 
calendars (n=7) 
FGDs (Meso) – VSLA (n=4) 
Key informant interviews (n=5) 
4  Rapid prototyping   Optional  Establish multiple 
intervention models that 
correspond with the 
landscape and 
archetypes needs. Use 
as validation and trigger 
material. 
Coding of gathered data  
Key Informant Interviews, Focus 
Group Discussions (Micro & Meso) 
Coding of gathered data, analysis of 
systematic gaps and brainstorming 
on solution by research team  
FGD (Micro & Meso): Verification 
workshop (n=30 participants) 
                                                          
1 This list is not exhaustive and alternative methods may be added  
2 Micro-level FGDs represent discussions amongst the specific actors targeted by a particular intervention whereas meso-
level FGDs refer to discussions with groups of individuals who represent a cohort of such actors, examples might include 
farmer group, cooperative society or market board representatives.   
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5  Design and Testing  Essential Elaborate intervention 
design(s) based on all 
previous steps. 
Qualitative and/or 
quantitative evidence of 
efficacy of intervention 
and implementation.  
Focus Group Discussions 
(Micro/Meso/Macro), Monitoring 
and Evaluation Methods, Field 
Experiments, (Randomised) Control 
Trials, Choice Experiments, 
Behavioural Experiments 
DCE (n=196) 
6  Upscaling  Essential  Validate assumptions 
and intervention design 
at new location(s). Adapt 
and iterate phases as 
required.  
Repeat stage 1-5    
 
In the following section we describe each of the six steps in the iterative Lambe et al. (2020a) 
framework. 
1. Problem co-definition  
Funders and/or programme designers may have a clearly defined vision of success that may involve 
some preliminary assumptions about the nature of the ‘problem’ and how this could be addressed.  
Crucially, these assumptions and any proposed solution need to be challenged and ideally ground-
truthed through engagement with actors3 who are the target of the intervention. Although often 
overlooked, engaging in an open discussion about the nature of the problem and critically reflecting 
on the assumptions that underpin any development intervention, prior to any form of design and 
implementation can ensure that the intervention aims to solve a problem that is defined or 
understood as such by the intended beneficiaries. As Leask et al. (2019) mention, the reason why 
many co-creative processes fail is because they set out with a project aim that is too broad and it can 
be beneficial to have end-users and other stakeholders to help researchers identify the objective of a 
study aiming to solve a complex problem. 
2. Actor-centred mapping  
Starting with the actors in question, the objective of this stage is to map out the decision-making 
landscape. This should encompass all aspects of the socio-economic, ecological, structural and 
institutional dimensions of the setting that explain actors’ current behaviour. Whilst the research 
team will be guided to a certain point by the wider objectives of the study (stage 1), at this point the 
objective is not to try to build solutions into this landscape, but rather to achieve a grounded and 
nuanced appreciation of the setting and space in which actors are operating in-situ. Multiple 
research approaches will be required to understand how different factors can influence the actors’ 
behaviour and explain features of their current circumstances. The threshold that is required from 
this stage is to establish an organic ‘boundary’ within which all significant discrete factors that can 
influence the targeted beneficiaries and their decision-making landscape, are mapped and 
understood. Identification of such factors is guided by the principle of 'differences that make a 
difference' to the user group in question (Bateson, 1972), and their significance is established 
                                                          
3 Given the scope of the programmes that we are hoping to support this term is difficult to define precisely for all settings 
but in general ‘actors’ refer to either interested groups or individuals within the setting in question. These could include 
individual households who are the targeted beneficiaries of a particular intervention, civil society groups, market traders 
and/or companies, government extension departments, etc.  
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through an ongoing process of verification and questioning to the point of saturation (Saunders et al, 
2018).   
3. Experience-based problem diagnosis  
Having confidently mapped out the boundaries, significant characteristics and influencing factors of 
the system, the next stage refocuses attention directly on the behaviour of the actors within the 
system that appear relevant to the wider objective of the study. At this point, it is thus reasonable 
that the problem definition established in stage 1 comes more clearly into view.   
Using methodologies adapted from Service Design approaches such as user journey mapping, key-
informant interviews and stakeholder verification workshops, the research team begins to develop a 
picture of actors’ behaviour within the system mapped out in stage 2. It is crucial to allow the actors 
themselves to lead the researchers through their actions and behaviours within the system over a 
relevant time period to help avoid inherited biases via common power dynamics between 
researchers and stakeholders. Trigger material can be used to facilitate the journey mapping and 
allow the actors to lead the process more easily. Over a repeated series of such interactions, actors’ 
behaviours may be mapped in the system until reaching saturation. 
It should be noted that the objective of the exercise is not to exclude differences between actors in 
the system intervention design, but rather establish how interventions may be able to meaningfully 
support transformational change to different actors or actor ‘archetypes’ that represent a composite 
image of a significant number of observed actors operating in the context. With archetypes we here 
mean patterns in the data that indicate that a certain behaviour, part of behaviour or even a set of 
behaviours can be attributed to a specific actor in regard to other factors such as socio-demographic 
characteristics or key drivers and motivations. These can be identified and derived from the coding 
and analysis of the qualitative data. However, these are ideally the result of both qualitative data 
analysis and a quantitative validation of archetypes to enable an investigation into the statistical 
significance and support for the identified archetypes.  
4. Rapid Prototyping  
In stage 4, the research team should be ready to develop a number of prototype interventions which 
are targeted to overcome the established problem. These prototypes could be single actions but 
more often will be a package of different actions that, in combination, encourage a normatively 
more positive outcome for the different actors or actor archetypes.4 The purpose of the exercise is 
twofold, i) to encourage input by actors into the creation of new prototypes and ii) to present and 
validate potential solutions. As such, the research team is encouraged to create an array of 
prototypes and share these with as many actors as possible – using them as trigger material to 
promote open and creative dialogue.  
Stakeholder verification of the research team’s understanding of the contextual and behavioural 
landscape is essential to the meaningfulness of the methodological approach and should be 
considered as part of an ongoing process. Table 1 highlights at which stages verification is particularly 
crucial. Yet, it is context and budget dependent what form this verification may take. It can be built 
into the daily field research cycle (see method details section 2), e.g. through intentional questions 
                                                          
4 For further insights on the range of interventions possible see Lambe et al, (in review).  
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included in interview guides for the subsequent fieldwork days, or occur in additional verification 
workshops. At an absolute minimum the product of stages 2-4 in the framework should be presented 
to a group of stakeholders who have knowledge about the system and can provide critical validation 
of system boundaries and features, identified archetypes and their relevant behaviour patterns. Last 
but not least, such a validation workshop should include a discussion and further development of the 
proposed prototypes.  
5. Design and testing  
Once insights from stages 2-4 have been validated and prototypes discussed, the research approach 
shifts from an exploratory to a more deterministic perspective. Integrating all important contextual 
insights from previous steps and the iterations of prototyping, more elaborate and operationalizable 
designs for interventions can be proposed and developed. These should be co-developed, and 
consider not only the design, but also the implementation of an intervention or development 
programme. The step is similar to that of prototyping in that the design is tested and verified by 
stakeholder interactions in iterative cycles before being finalised upon saturation. Testing can 
happen a priory any implementation, or as part of early localised pilot projects. However, the change 
in methodological approach should not be seen as final, separate or distinct, but rather as a further 
iterative step in the process. As in any stage, if the need arises to move back to the exploratory 
stage, this is welcome and encouraged.  
Several methods are available to perform such testing - from qualitative methods of monitoring and 
evaluation, to quantitative experimental methods to provide a rigorous test of intervention efficacy - 
and methodological choice will depend on the nature of the intervention and/or the capacities of 
the research team. In Osborne et al. (2021, World Development, in review WD-19535) we elaborate 
on the value of combining Service Design with quantitative experimental designs, in particular with 
Discrete Choice Experiments, as a means of verification and testing throughout steps 4 (prototyping) 
and 5 (design and testing). As Discrete Choice Experiments are a methodological approach in their 
own rights, the practical steps involved in their implementation are described in a separate section 
below.  
6. Scaling up  
After analysis of the testing stage, the possibility to expand beyond the original geographic scope 
can be explored. This will, to amount to the underlying principles of our methodology, require a 
repetition of all of the previous stages – to ensure that assumptions are tested, the decision-making 
landscape and actor’s behaviour is mapped within the ‘new’ system, incorporating any relevant 
differences into the design of new interventions. In practice however, the project iteration of the 
conceptual framework can be completed in a far quicker and more targeted fashion than the original 
operation.  Nonetheless, it is crucial that space is provided to allow for creative input and the agency 
to influence the intervention design by the proximate targeted actors.   
 
2. Field Research Cycle  
A research project team will usually consist of 4-8 lead researchers with a similar number of local 
research assistants/translators. The length of time required to complete the cycle described above 
will depend on the complexity of the challenge and the availability of resources. Typically, stages 1-4 
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can be completed in under a month of fieldwork, and usually in significantly less time than this (see 
e.g. Lambe et al. 2018, 2020b; Muhoza and Johnson 2018; Jürisoo et al. 2018)). The time required for 
the quantitative assessment (stage 5) will vary significantly dependent on the nature of the 
intervention. Discrete Choice Experiments are a comparatively low-cost and rapid testing strategy 
compared to more extensive experimental designs, such as Randomised Control Trials, and brings 
the advantage of providing informative results prior to programme implementation (Osborne et al., 
2021, World Development, in review WD-19535).   
During qualitative fieldwork – stages 2-4 – the daily cycle of activities is organised in three distinct 
phases: i) a preparatory planning session, ii) a data collection session and iii) a reporting and analysis 
session (Figure 2).   
Figure 2.  Field Research Cycle  
 
Preparatory planning session  
At the start of each fieldwork day, the research team meets to review the primary questions of 
interest and consequent methods for that day and organise the composition of the individual 
research units for that day’s data collection. This meeting will be informed by the findings of the 
previous day(s)’ fieldwork, meaning that a range of different questions may be explored by different 
research units using different methods. Once the research team has an agreed approach for the day, 
the team divides into units and begins the fieldwork.  
Data collection session  
Data collection is conducted by smaller research units, typically composed of one lead researcher 
and one research assistant/translator, but could be larger for group-based activities. Individual 
research units should be encouraged to think and act independently and pursue unanticipated 
questions of interest that may present themselves during the course of their activities. This 
disaggregated approach not only increases the number of independent observations obtained - and 









unanticipated, but potentially highly significant insights into the wider research team’s collective 
understanding of the context, practice or action under observation.   
Reporting and analysis session   
Reporting and analytical sessions are always conducted at the end of each day’s fieldwork when the 
entire research team reconvenes to report back their findings. Each research unit begins by 
reporting back to the wider team the findings of their day’s activities. Reporting back can be 
expressed in different formats depending on the context of the project. However, the reporting 
session always results in a shared board of collectively coded data, comprised on the findings of all 
research units. In addition, individual research teams always record data from each field activity, so 
that any analysis of data can always be traced to the raw data source.  
Once the daily findings have been reported and recorded, a process of immediate analysis is 
engaged in as a collective group. During these discussions, multiple observations of similar actions or 
characteristics of the context are grouped together, and over a number of days a detailed mapping 
of the context under examination will be obtained. It is also during these discussions that differences 
in observations are explored and, if deemed pertinent, time and resources are set aside to further 
explore such inconsistencies during subsequent fieldwork days. As different aspects of the context 
become consolidated, the focus of the research project will begin to shift to new areas of 
investigation and stages in the process, which will then feed into the direction and agenda for the 
subsequent day’s fieldwork preparatory planning session.   
 
3. Discrete Choice Experiments 
Discrete choice experiments are a quantitative method to elicit potential users’ preferences over 
design elements of a good, service or programme (Mangham et al., 2009). In a face-to-face 
questionnaire setting, potential users or targeted beneficiaries (hereafter called ‘actors’) are 
repeatedly presented with a set of hypothetical alternatives of a good, service or programme 
(hereafter called ‘intervention’), and asked to indicate which they would prefer to purchase or 
participate in (Greiner et al., 2014; Raes et al., 2017; Vorlaufer et al., 2017). Based on utility theory 
(Brett Hauber et al., 2016; McFadden, 1974), potential actors’ preferences are assumed to be 
determined by the design features that define and distinguish interventions. Hence, in a DCE, each 
intervention alternative is described by a list of attributes. The attributes take on different levels 
across the alternatives, with varying combinations between the attributes (Kløjgaard et al., 2012). 
Through the experimental design of alternatives and sets of alternatives within which different 
designs are compared (hereafter referred to as ‘choice sets’), statistical inference can be drawn 
about the relative importance of different attributes and levels for future users’ preferences (Brett 
Hauber et al., 2016; Mangham et al., 2009). It is assumed that participants’ stated preferences 
indicate their real-world willingness to pay, participate, or accept (Johnston et al., 2017).  
DCEs are a particularly useful methodology to complement Service Design for three reasons. First, 
they allow to upscale and leverage in-depth insights from the participation of comparatively few 
potential users during Service Design fieldwork to the wider community level. DCEs can be designed 
to validate insights and compare the potential of different ideas for programme design elements 
resulting from qualitative Service Design. Using typical household survey strategies, they can capture 
the perspectives from a representative sample of potential users. Second, DCEs are compatible with 
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Service Design’s core values and guiding principles. As DCEs build on hypothetical scenarios, their 
content is adaptable to local contexts and other qualitative Service Design results (Coast et al., 
2012). Targeted at understanding participants’ individual preferences (e.g. compared to cost and 
benefit analyses), targeted actors are set at the centre of investigation. Through collecting additional 
information on participant characteristics, attention can be paid to heterogeneity and potential 
differences in preferences across actors and actor archetypes (Johnston et al., 2017). Additionally, 
DCEs can incorporate engaging visual material to illustrate the alternative scenarios (Veldwijk et al., 
2015). Third, DCEs appear particularly suitable as an experimentation in early rounds of iteration as 
part of Service Design, as they can provide ex-ante insights, before any service implementation has 
to take place (Johnston et al., 2017). Relative to other experimentation, such as Randomised Control 
Trials, they are also low cost and quick to implement.  
The design of DCEs is highly decisive in whether valuable, valid and reliable information can be 
inferred (Johnston et al., 2017; Kløjgaard et al., 2012; Mangham et al., 2009). It involves the two 
steps of selecting attributes and levels; and combining levels and alternatives into choice sets.  
Attributes describe each alternative and thus determine the explanatory variables for participants’ 
choices that can be analysed through a DCE (Brett Hauber et al., 2016). They should be chosen 
carefully, with a set of criteria in mind: The scenarios presented in a DCE should most closely match 
real-life conditions, and be correctly and identically understood by all participants (Mangham et al., 
2009; Abiiro et al., 2014). Their descriptions need to be maximally complete, leaving no gaps for 
individual interpretation to avoid omitted variable bias (Coast et al., 2012; Kløjgaard et al., 2012). 
Yet, at the same time, the number of attributes is limited by participants’ cognitive capacity to take 
into account all alternating attributes (DeShazo & Fermo, 2002). Lastly, there should be no 
conceptual overlap between attributes to avoid multicollinearity (Mangham et al., 2009). These 
considerations have led to the established best practice of selecting and defining attributes based on 
combining a thorough (systematic) literature review with prior in-depth qualitative fieldwork (Abiiro 
et al., 2014; Mangham et al., 2009).  Depending on the number of attributes and levels, there are 
typically several thousand possibilities to combine alternatives into choice sets. As it is unfeasible to 
present participants with a complete set of combinations, a sample of these need to be drawn. Hole 
(2016) provides a simplified explanation to the statistical procedure of selecting the most effective 
sample of choice sets to be included. For illustration, we describe how we applied this in our 
Ugandan case study below. DCEs are typically analysed using random effects models to account for 
the panel structure in the data through repeatedly presenting choice sets to the same participants 
(Johnston et al., 2017). 
 
Methodological Application to Weather Index Insurance in eastern Uganda 
Our fieldwork in Uganda was conducted between February and August 2018. The research team for 
the stages 1-4 consisted of 4 lead researchers and 4 research assistants/translators. All interviews 
and focus group discussions were held in a mixture of the local language (Lugisu) and English. Stages 
2-4 were conducted within one week in April. Data collection for the DCE in stage 5 was conducted 
by 5 enumerators (4 of which participated as assistants/translators and one as lead researcher 
during stages 2-5) and required 2 weeks in July. 
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1. Problem co-definition  
In our case study, the problem co-definition was rooted in a long engagement of researchers with 
research users and beneficiaries that suggested to us the importance of the Service Design-DCE 
research reported on here.  
Experimental economists from the University of East Anglia (UEA) and partnership institutions have 
studied the risk-taking and risk-sharing habits of smallholder farmers in Bugisu in eastern Uganda 
since 2001.5 Working with major insurance companies in the country, agricultural extensionists, 
farmers’ organisations, seed companies and agro-dealers, research findings were translated into  
recommendations for risk protection measures that would encourage agricultural investment, 
increase the productivity of farms, and lead to higher incomes and poverty reduction (Balungira et 
al., 2016; McSherry, 2017). The main recommendation was to bundle Weather Index Insurance with 
authenticated agricultural inputs and credit, as well as to offer this to established risk-sharing 
groups, in particular village savings and loans associations (VSLAs) (Verschoor et al., 2016). 
However, UEA’s economists involved in the research were not confident in this recommendation. It 
was inferred from research findings obtained in lab-in-the-field experiments and therefore based on 
behaviour observed in stylised settings, in which hypotheses are tested about particular factors in 
isolation by keeping all other relevant factors at bay that determine behaviour in real life. In complex 
settings, these other factors interplay with the factors tested, which may undo or reinforce (as the 
case may be) the effect of the factors studied in the experiments. Moreover, it was silent about 
some of the other factors that previous studies of WII have found to be important in determining its 
desirability for purposes of risk protection.6  
UEA’s economists thus faced the challenge of understanding better (than their experiments had 
allowed them to) the complexity of factors behind risk protection that would interplay with the 
provision of WII in the context of farmers’ livelihoods in Bugisu. In order to meet this challenge, they 
teamed up with Service Design experts from the Stockholm Environment Institute for implementing 
the study whose methods are described in this paper.  
We started off our fieldwork in Bwikhonge, a sub-county of Bugisu, where UEA’s work on risk and 
insurance had taken place, with a household survey, two meso-level focus group discussions (FGDs) 
with farmer representatives, and a key informant interview with the local council III chairperson. The 
household survey with randomly sampled household heads or their spouses (n=100) and one FGD 
(n=8 participants) confirmed that most families in Bwikhonge (above 90%) had been affected by 
both drought or dry spells and agricultural pests in the proceeding twelve months and perceived 
them as the most worrying agricultural risks. The key informant interview gave insight to existing 
formal and informal social institutions that support farmers, including amongst others external 
microcredit institutions. Learning about the challenges these external financial organisations had 
                                                          
5 Research findings are reported in inter alia Humphrey and Verschoor (2004a,b), Harrison et al. (2010), 
D’Exelle and Verschoor (2015), Verschoor et al. (2016) and Verschoor and D’Exelle (2021). 
6 For instance, a large number of studies have found that illiquidity, i.e. not having sufficient cash at hand when 
the premium payment is due, is negatively associated with WII uptake (Giné et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2012, 
2013; Hill et al., 2013; Akter et al., 2016; Casaburi and Willis, 2018; Belissa et al., 2019). As well as illiquidity, 
lack of trust in the provider and/or lack of trust in the product has frequently been found to impede WII uptake 
(Giné et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2012, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), and the suggestion has been made to use trusted 
pay-out channels to increase uptake (Giné et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2013). 
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experienced in spurring trust and uptake amongst the local population highlighted that any financial 
service offered in the area would have to closely reflect local conditions in design and delivery. A 
repeated FGD (n=8 participants, 16 sessions) specifically aimed at proposing and discussing WII 
revealed an interest to learn about the mechanism, but also the need for close consideration of how 
it could be made affordable, attractive and trustworthy in the local context. 
2. Actor-centred mapping  
To better understand the key actors, i.e. Bwikhonge’s smallholder farmers, and their decision-
making landscape in regard to the focus of the problem and potential intervention we set off aiming 
to understand farmers’ daily lives in their everyday context – including agricultural practices, 
livelihood strategies, roles within the household (particularly regarding income generation and 
financial decision making), market value chains, and social networks. A particular focus area that 
recurred in the actor-centred mapping was to understand how farmers experienced and perceived 
risks throughout the year. The actor-centred mapping was carried out using three methods; i) semi-
structured interviews, ii) participatory observations and iii) focus group discussions (FGDs). These 
methods are further described below. 
Following an interview frame covering the above mentioned themes, we conducted in-depth semi-
structured interviews (n=12, sessions of 1-2h) with individual household heads and spouses. To allow 
the interviewee to lead the researchers through their everyday life and context, rather than that 
researchers asked leading questions about farmer activities, we used trigger material such as laying 
picture cards and drawings of everyday recurring items and activities that the interviewee could use 
to map their doing during a time cycle of a day, a month and a year. To triangulate these narrated 
insights and gain a contextualised and visual impression, we also conducted participant observations 
(n=20, sessions of 1-2h). Participant observations involved being shown around people’s houses and 
farms whilst talking through daily practices and common experiences in situ. During FGDs (n=7, 4-6 
participants and sessions of 1-2h), household heads and spouses – some of which were separated by 
gender to encourage open participation – mapped typical daily practices and yearly cycles of 
agricultural production, weather patterns and risks, as well as market value chains for different 
crops. In the same way as in interviews, trigger material was used in order to allow participants to 
lead researchers through the mapping of daily, monthly and yearly cycles (see supplementary 
material for illustrative photographs). The FGDs were facilitated by lead researchers asking probing 
questions along the key lines of enquiry.  
During the actor-centred mapping we learnt that the majority of active social networks and market 
interaction (i.e. direct selling of agricultural produce and buying of inputs) is bound to the Bwikhonge 
sub-county level. Contacts to external actors are generally channeled through selected local actors 
(e.g. cotton agent, local traders/store owners) and only few farmers extend their regular interactions 
to the next closest town Mbale. We therefore decided to keep our focus at the threshold of the local 
level. 
3. Experience-based problem diagnosis  
As saturation was reached on contextual factors during the actor-centred mapping, we focused 
questions more around perceptions and behaviours relevant to WII. During further FGDs (n=7, 4-6 
participants and sessions of 1-2h) we more thoroughly mapped patterns of risk occurrence and 
overlapped this with annual cycles of income and expenses, or glut and lean times. In individual 
13 
interviews (n=8 and sessions of 1-2h), we mapped individual households’ risk response journeys by 
asking about their coping strategies the last time they were affected by a drought or pest. 
Researchers asked questions like; what did you do first when exposed to a drought/pest? What did 
you do next? What did you do last?  
Drawing together the insights from the different research teams in reporting and analysis sessions 
(as described in the method details section 2 above), we started to loosely observe a pattern in 
different households’ risk response mechanisms. To support our forming of hypotheses, we moved 
to conducting shorter targeted interviews (n=23, sessions of 0,5h), which, besides mapping risk 
responses, captured households’ agricultural and economic diversification, formal institutional, and 
informal social networks. For this, we developed a one-page template to be filled in during each 
interview (see supplementary material for an example). This allowed to compare and roughly 
categorise interviewed farmers by their risk coping capacity based on the four areas found to enable 
and strengthen effective risk responses (i.e. agricultural and economic diversification, and formal 
institutional and informal social networks). This exercise reinforced the importance of challenging the 
notion of ‘the community’ as a homogenous unit by recognising the inequalities in capabilities and 
power within the community.  
A pattern emerged and allowed to tentatively frame three archetypes in relation to farmers’ risk 
coping capacity. For illustration purposes, we named the three archetypes by the locally common 
names ‘Andrew’, ‘Betty’ and ‘Charles’ (see supplementary material for an illustration of the three 
archetypes).  
- ‘Andrews’, own up to ten acres of land and six cows, grow a variety of cash crops, run a store 
and local brew business, as well as run and participate in several savings groups, and count 
with several friends and family inside and beyond the community. Consequently, they have 
an array of risk response options.  
- ‘Betties’ in contrast are the least resilient to agricultural shocks, with very limited options for 
diversification. ‘Betties’ own very little land, no livestock, earn some cash income through 
casual labour, yet insufficient to participate in savings groups, and count with limited social 
support from friends and family.  
- ‘Charleses’ in turn count with medium risk coping capacity. They own two to three acres of 
land, grow a diversity of subsistence and cash crops, hold around two goats and a cow, and 
enjoy close integration in the community as well as participation in a variety of community 
savings groups. 
We found that different archetypes build on different social support mechanisms in times of 
hardship. To better understand the role of these different support mechanisms, we conducted key 
informant semi-structured interviews (n=5, sessions of 1-2h) with selected actors along market value 
chains that had been mentioned as trusted sources of financial support and advice, such as a cotton 
agent (broker between the community and cotton development organisation) and a store owner. We 
also conducted additional FGDs (n=4, 4-6 participants, sessions of 1-2h) with members of savings 
groups, such as VSLAs, burial groups and merry-go-rounds, to understand their functioning, as well as 
with non-members to understand their reasons not to participate. 
4. Rapid Prototyping  
Building on the insights from the three first steps of the methodological framework applied in this 
paper, we gained insights on the current risk perceptions, behaviours and coping capacities that WII 
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would be placed into and should build on for these to be useful for farmers. Thus, through manual 
coding and analysis of the interviews, FGDs and participatory observations in the actor-centred 
mapping and the additional interviews and FGDs conducted to perform experience-based problem 
diagnosis, the research team identified four potential insurance designs to propose to farmers as 
prototypes of WII interventions. An important finding at this stage was that it appeared important to 
acknowledge the different archetypes’ needs and capabilities in the spectrum of suggestions in order 
for interventions to be useful more broadly in the community and not only or specifically for one 
type of farmer.  
The four prototypes were simple in their design and were, at this stage, used to spur discussion with 
the farmers that would help elaborating more detailed design elements in later steps of the design 
of interventions.  
All four prototypes built on the general logic of insurance providing compensation payouts in the 
occurrence of a shock, whilst the first three worked through an external financial agent. Under the 
first prototype, large monetary premiums would allow for large risk coverage and large monetary 
payouts. The second is a smaller version of the first with small monetary premiums and equivalently 
small risk coverage and monetary payouts. The third prototype was of medium size, with moderate 
monetary premiums, and payouts in form of agricultural inputs, such as seed and pesticides. The 
fourth prototype built on the local system of risk sharing through savings groups aimed at allowing 
more cash constraint households to participate through small weekly contributions compared to a 
one-off premium. Community-based insurance groups would save together throughout the year, 
and in the event of a weather shock would jointly invest in agricultural inputs to recover for the next 
season.  
To terminate the qualitative fieldwork phase we organised a validation workshop to which we 
invited 40 representatives from local community organisations, including VSLAs and farmer groups, 
but also ‘ordinary’ farmers, and representatives from different local churches, mosques and schools, 
as well as local government. We ensured close to equal representation of female and male 
participants. Representatives from locally operating banks and NGOs were also invited, however, did 
not attend the workshop. The workshop consisted of two parts, starting with the presentation and 
validation of research findings in the morning, followed by a discussion on the viability of the 
different prototypes in the afternoon. The participants were separated into four working groups, in 
which the findings from the stages 2-4 were presented and discussed. Fieldwork assistants facilitated 
the discussions in the local language and took notes throughout. Visual aids, such as illustrative 
posters with paintings and picture cards made the process interactive. When information was added 
or changes suggested, these were noted down and added to the visual material used in the 
workshop. After each stage was presented and discussed in working groups, feedback from each 
group was reported in plenary. Particular emphasis was put on the annual cycle of agricultural 
practices, risks, income flows and times of hardship, the archetype distinctions and how the 
prototypes could or not meet the different archetypes’ needs. 
5. Design and testing  
In line with the methodological combination proposed in this paper and Osborne et al. (2021, World 
Development, in review WD-19535), we chose to conduct a Discrete Choice Experiment in this case 
study to test and further build on the design emerging from the prototyping and the qualitative 
insights from the stages 1-4. 
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DCE Design 
To design the DCE on WII for Bwikhonge, we started with a literature review with the aim to identify 
all important features defining a WII service. We compiled these in a list and systematically added to 
each element relevant observations from the local context in Bwikhonge by reviewing fieldwork 
notes and reports from the prior Service Design stages (see supplementary material). We then 
selected 5 attributes which most strongly captured areas of sensitivity highlighted in the literature 
and could provide clarity on open questions that had emerged through or remained after the prior 
Service Design fieldwork and analysis. These became the attributes distinguishing one alternative 
from the other in the DCE. The rich contextual knowledge gained through the prior qualitative 
fieldwork guided the general framing of the DCE (table 2). 
Farmers were asked to imagine being offered an insurance service by an external company that 
provides payouts in the occurrence of insufficient rainfall (i.e. drought and dry spells) for the 
cultivation of maize during the first annual season. The price for the insurance was left unspecified, 
but to be imagined as generally affordable and reasonable. Affordability in a context of limited 
liquidity remained an important concern among the participants of the verification workshop. 
Rather than including a price at artificial and potentially unrealistic levels, we introduced two viable 
instruments as alternating attributes in the DCE that could help improve affordability. The first 
attribute offered reducing the cost by covering single growth phases rather than the whole season 
(Hazell & Hess 2010). From stage 2 of the Service Design we know that the growth phases of maize 
sensitive to sufficient rainfall are ‘germination, ‘plant growth’, and ‘flowering’. The second attribute 
aimed at easing liquidity constraints by enabling premium payment at times of increased cash 
availability (Mcintosh et al., 2013). From mapping annual cycles of lean and glut times in stage 3 we 
learnt that cash is relatively abundant in August-September (after the main maize harvest) and 
November-December (after the harvest of the second season). The natural period for purchasing WII 
just before the main growing season (January-February) in contrast is characterised by financial 
pressures for several simultaneously necessary expenses (e.g. for school fees, agricultural inputs 
and/or renting in land). These three periods were thus included as different options for the timing of 
premium payments. 
Next to affordability, lack of trust in the provider and/or product has been found a frequent barrier 
to WII uptake (Giné et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2012, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014). By mapping market 
value chains, we identified local actors and payment channels that seemed worth investigating as 
trusted pay-out channels to potentially increase the uptake of WII (Giné et al., 2008; Cole et al., 
2013). The levels included for the attribute ‘pay-out delivery channel’ were a ‘local agent’, an ‘agro-
input shop’ and ‘mobile money’.  
To help address also non-weather-related risks, ‘bundling’ – combining the insurance with the 
purchase of other agricultural inputs or services – has been discussed a strategy to increase the 
value of WII (Awondo et al., 2017; Ward & Makhija, 2018). In Bwikhonge, crop pests and diseases 
and purchasing counterfeit inputs are the next most prominent risks after droughts and dry spells. 
To alleviate these, we suggested providing WII in combination with ‘certified seed’ and ‘pesticide’. 
Additionally, we investigated whether adding an ‘agro-input loan’ to the bundle would increase the 
WII’s attractiveness. 
Finally, Trærup (2012), De Janvry et al. (2014) and Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012, 2013) propose 
offering WII to savings groups rather than individuals. This, to support savings groups when 
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accumulated funds are insufficient to provide loans to all its members in times of common shocks. In 
our preliminary household survey, 61 percent of respondents reported at least one household 
member to participate in a VSLA, more than for any other social institution. At the same time, 
however, the qualitative fieldwork revealed considerable mistrust in the functioning of VSLAs, e.g. 
having heard of incidences where money went missing. To identify the demand for group 
insurances, we specified two levels for the attribute ‘policy holder’ – ‘individual’ and ‘savings group’. 
 
Table 2. DCE attributes and levels based on Service Design observations 
Phase 1: Service Design Phase 2: Discrete Choice Experiment 
Observation Defined Attribute Defined Level 













D. Farming & Risk Cycle Bundling 
No Bundling 
Certified Seeds 
Certified Seeds & Pesticides 
Certified Seeds, Pesticides & Loans 
E. Risk Coping Strategies and Social Institutions Insured Unit 
Individual Insurance 
Savings Group Insurance 
 
The defined attributes and levels can be combined into ((4 × 3 × 3 × 2 × 4) × (4 × 3 × 3 × 2 × 4 −
1))/2 = 41,328 possible choice sets, an unfeasible number to present each participant with. 
Instead, as is common practice, we obtained an optimal fractional factorial design using the user-
written STATA-command dcreate (Hole, 2016; appendix 6). An optimal fractional factorial design is a 
sample of choice sets that is maximally orthogonal, i.e. with statistically independent attribute levels, 
balanced, i.e. with each level occurring equally often, and utility balanced, i.e. with no objectively 
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superior alternative, with minimal overlap of levels within choice sets (Mangham et al., 2009). 
Dcreate utilises the Fedorov-algorithm to identify the design with maximal D-efficiency, an inverse 
function of the covariance-matrix of the attributes’ parameter estimates (Hole, 2016). The 
calculation is based on parameter priors equal to zero, as is common practice in the absence of 
legitimate priors from the literature (Johnston et al., 2017). 
In addition to the DCE, we asked each participant a number of generic survey questions. Importantly, 
we added questions in relation to the archetypes identified during stage 3. On the one side, we 
collected data on people’s agricultural and economic diversity (e.g. land ownership, cultivated crops 
and number of owned livestock, and the household’s involvement in non-agricultural economic 
activities), as well as membership in community organisations and informal social networks. On the 
other side, we showed participants three cards visually illustrating the three archetypes and their 
distinctive characteristics – ‘Andrew’, ‘Betty’ and ‘Charles’ – and asked them to indicate which 
archetype they would allocate themselves to (see supplementary material).  
DCE data collection 
Data collection for the DCE occurred in the same 10 villages in Bwikhonge sub-county that 
participated in previous fieldwork. For each selected village, local mobilisers compiled a sampling 
frame of all households and their heads and spouses. A simple random sample of 22 households per 
village was selected of which 2 served as replacement for non-response. With equal inclusion 
probability, either the household head or spouse was invited to participate. During stage 2 we learnt 
that both household heads and spouses take agriculture-related decisions and are equally aware of 
agricultural hazards. When the sampled household representative was unavailable, their spouse was 
interviewed instead. The final sample consists of 196 respondents and 4 choice set non-responses. 
This sample size falls within the range of rule of thumb DCE sample size requirements (de Bekker-
Grob et al., 2015).  
Given the relatively complex concept of WII, we ran a workshop for each participant to take part in 
before participating in the DCE. The workshop was designed with sensitivity to different levels of 
literacy and education amongst the participants using visualisations and locally understandable 
terms to describe the concept of WII (see supplementary material for the workshop outline). 
Qualitative feedback questions during the workshop ensured each participant’s understanding. The 
DCE was administered in local language using laminated choice set cards with illustrations for each 
attribute (Figure. 3). Each respondent was presented with 12 choice sets of two alternatives each, 
followed by the more generic questionnaire. Data was collected following a script (see 








Figure 3. Example Choice Set 












Whole Season Covered 
  
 
Plant Growth Covered 
 
Premium in January + 
February 
  
Premium in August + 
September 
 




Pay-out through Mobile 
Money 
 
DCE analysis  
For the analysis of the choice data we proceeded as follows. The choice data set can be thought of as 
having a panel structure: it contains the sets of 12 responses each, i.e. 12 choices between two 
insurance options, of 196 respondents. To account for unobserved heterogeneity at the respondent 
level, we estimated a random effects probit model. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if an 
option is chosen, 0 if it is not. We estimated two models, one estimating the unconditional effect of 
insurance being offered to savings groups (model 1), the other with that effect conditioned on land 
ownership and trust in the savings group (model 2) (see Osborne et al., 2021, World Development, in 
review WD-19535). The rationale for conditioning on these factors is straightforward. Land 
ownership proxies for local influence: more influential members of the VSLA should be expected to 
be able to draw on the VSLA’s reserves before others and would therefore benefit more than others 
when WII fails to pay out when agricultural losses are made. Trust in the VSLA proxies for the 
confidence members have that when WII fails to pay out, the VSLA will support them. Both models 
control for age, sex, level of education, and land owned.  
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6. Scaling up  
After completion of the Service Design and DCE phases the data and evidence established is 
evaluated in the round. At this point it is important to explore and analyze what each approach has 
been able to contribute and what collective recommendations can be made, based on this process of 
triangulation, to inform the design of subsequent intervention models. As described in Osborne et al. 
(2021, World Development, in review WD-19535), the study’s combined Service Design and DCE 
findings led UEA economists to drop their recommendation to provide WII through VSLAs, while 
advocating bundling WII with certified inputs and credit. The recommendation was adopted by the 
Ugandan insurance companies united in the Agriculture Insurance Consortium, which industry 
experts recognise had a considerable impact on the success of its nation-wide WII scheme. The 
contribution of UEA economists’ recommendations to the provision of bundled WII in Uganda is 
described in UKRI (2020). Work is ongoing on risk-protection schemes that do justice to the 
heterogeneity of risk coping that the Service Design research helped to uncover. 
 
Conclusion 
Whilst both Service Design and DCEs can operate as an independent body of work, and each has its 
own strengths and limitations, as a combined approach, it is cheap, quick and reduces the risk of 
doing harm whilst providing an opportunity to deliver well-designed projects at scale. Our experience 
of combining both approaches in the application to WII in eastern Uganda demonstrated their 
complementarity: DCEs can help test and validate the fine-grained locally informed insights of Service 
Design, whilst Service Design provides the rich contextual knowledge required for an effective and 
robust experimental design. As with all new methodological innovations, we would be very happy to 
see what lessons may be learnt from its application in new areas and to new research questions, 
nonetheless we are confident that it can provide a positive contribution to designing development 
interventions in complex and challenging settings. 
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Image 1. Meso-level Focus Group Discussion (FGD) – Stage 1 
 
 





Image 3. Participant Observation (2) – Stage 2 
 
 




Image 5. Micro-level FGD (Mapping the maize value chain) – Stage 2 
 
 
Image 6. Seasonal calendar (Annual cycle of weather patterns/risks, agricultural practices and lean 










Image 7. Value chain map with important actors – Stage 3 
 
 
Image 8. Interview template for targeted interviews (mapping risk coping capacity in terms of 
agricultural diversity, non-agricultural income, social networks and institutions in the circle, as well 





Image 9. Validation workshop (1) – Stage 5 
 
 





Image 11. Validation Workshop (3) (Simple representation of archetypes on posters) – Stage 5 
 
Image 12. Validation Workshop (4) (Output from discussion on the viability of the different 
prototypes for ‘Andrews’) – Stage 5 
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Table 1. DCE design: Literature review and relevant primary data for attribute and level selection – Stage 6 
Attributes  Levels Observations made by WII authors Relevant observations from field work  







WII should be offered in areas where weather brings the highest risk, 
otherwise, basis risk is higher (2, 16, 25) and the product loses 
attractiveness (13). 
 
Open for discussion, whether low impact, high frequency (6) or high 
impact, low frequency risk should be covered (14) 
 
Weather does not provide the only risk to agriculture. Can also other risks 
be included in the insurance schemes? (6) 
 
Size of the insured risk increases uptake, similarly, higher basis risk 
decreases uptake. (12) 
96% of respondents to the household survey mentioned drought as an agricultural risks 
they face as a household, with 54% finding it the most worrying risk. Only 54% mentioned 
flooding and 21% unfitting rainfall patterns, whilst 97% mentioned pests and diseases. 
 
The high awareness of the risk of pests and diseases may be linked to a recency bias, as an 





crop unrelated – 
Subsistence 




most investment – 
Crops most prone to 
risk 
For index composition, only insuring single crops is most easily feasible. 
Yet, with increasing prevalence of mixed cropping systems, this may not 
be as meaningful to insurance holders (3). In order not to discourage 
diversification, multiple crops should be covered (6). 
 
The crops bringing most income should be targeted (6). 
99% of respondents to the survey grow maize and 78% state it to be their first most 
important crop, 16% regard it as the second most important, 3% as the third most 
important. 
  
Assuming, the drought happens in May/June, then mostly first season crops are affected: 
maize, for few farmers cotton and sunflower. The rice, tomatoes and cabbage grown 
during this season is planted in the wetlands, were the drought does not hit as severely 
(stakeholder workshop reflections by facilitators). 
 
As the income from one crop often finances the investment into growing the next, crops 









Often WII covers the whole season, whilst there are specific times that are 
most prone to crop damage through the weather induced risk. 
Concentrating on a specific time can make the premium cheaper (2). 
 
The phase facing the most severe risk should be insured against (14). 
 
Giving the farmer the choice, which phase to protect may increase 
attractiveness (24). 
The first season starts in January/February and ends in July/August. 
The second season starts in August and ends in November/December. 
 
Maize is only grown during the first season. 
 
Drought is reported to occur mostly during May/June, within which the exact occurrence 
varies. This is typically during the flowering stage of maize. 
 




variables taken into 
account 
The index should capture multidimensional data most closely reflecting 
the actual losses farmers occur in order to reduce basis risk (1, 7, 8,  12, 
26). 
 
This may include rainfall data from satellite/weather stations (1), 
accumulative rainfall over time /number of dry days (17), soil water 








Premium levels  matter for insurance demand and affordability (3, 9, 15, 
16, 18). 
 
Due to affordability constraints, there is the expectation of lower income 
households relying on low premium rates for WII uptake (12). 
 
Studies find that WTP is generally below actuarially fair prices (22, 23). 
 
Some evidence suggests that premium levels should not be fully 
Andrews (i.e. farmers with large risk coping capacities) can afford high premiums and 
would be willing to pay as 1. they have enough income for affording it and 2. may be  
interested in a high pay-out, given that they invest a lot. 
Betties (i.e. farmers with very low risk coping capacities) could only afford very small 
levels, relying on little money received though casual labour. 
(SD analysis and stakeholder workshop) 
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subsidised, but rather shared for long-term development of WII (4). 
Loading of 
the insurance  




(ratio of premium and expected pay-out) 
 







Paying for premiums through produce or labour may enable farmers with 
little cash availability to take part in the insurance scheme (21).  
Betties rely on cash income from casual labour. Currently, they do not have enough 
money to join savings/burial groups. (SD POs and PIs and stakeholder workshop) 
 
Yet, generally, there seems to be an active commercial market for produce and labour, so 
that such goods and services can relatively easily be translated into monetary terms 
(almost constant farm labour demand, proximity of produce stores who buy and sell small 
and big quantities of produce throughout the year and availability of agro-input dealers 






Farmers farming on a commercial basis may prefer monetary outcomes. 
Those relying on their yield for consumption may be in need of pay-outs in 
kind (food or inputs for the next season) (3). 
Andrews would be interested in monetary pay-outs, in order to cover lost investments.  
Charleses (i.e. farmers with medium risk coping capacities) may be interested in inputs for 
the next season, however may appreciate to choose by themselves what to use the pay-
out for, i.e. would prefer a pay-out in monetary terms. 
Betties may be most interested in food for consumption, as this is what their original loss 
occurred in. Betties grow for food security. If the yield fails, this means food is missing. 
(SD POs and PIs and stakeholder workshop) 
 
Yet, generally, there seems to be an active commercial market for produce/food and 
inputs, so that such goods can relatively easily be bought, when a monetary pay-out is 
received (proximity of produce stores who sell small and big quantities of produce 
throughout the year and availability of agro-input dealers selling inputs). 








lenders/ informal risk 
Often uptake is limited by lacking trust in that policy holders indeed will 
receive pay-outs they are entitled to (4, 5, 15). 
How trust in the insurance product can be generated is crucial especially 
Farmers in Bwikhonge seem used to working through agents and being organised in 
groups (there is a cotton agent, agents assisting produce stores or traders, agents of 
NGOs/banks, savings/burial/farmers groups etc.) (SD PI and Field Workshops, key 








when targeted to risk averse farmers (6, 9) in contexts lacking a 
functioning legal framework (2) and where insurance providers have built 
bad reputations (6).  
 
Trust in the marketing agents could increase trust in the product and thus 
demand (15, 25). Familiarity with the vendor increases uptake (12) 
 
The delivery channel may be organised in such a way, that an agent in 
agreement with farmers buys the insurance him/herself and in event of 
the risk distributes the pay-out amongst the farmers, who in 
compensation pay through labour or produce at the end of the season 
(26). 
 
Creating partnerships between insurance providers and providers of 
complimentary services can facilitate the success of the insurance 
initiative (1, 13). 
groups.) 
 
Particularly about the cotton agent (passing over inputs (seed, pesticides and fertiliser) 
and payments between farmers and the Ginneries and Cotton Export Association/Cotton 
Development Organisation) many people express trust and positive relations. (SD field 
workshops, FGD on crop value chains and key informant interviews) 
 
ACE is an active co-operative in the area, yet not the majority of farmers is involved in it. 












Fixed/flexible – At the 
beginning of the 
season/at harvest. 
Insurance often paid for at the beginning of the season. Yet, this is the 
time, many other investments are being made and insurance may not 
easily compete with necessary goods such as seed. Premium payments 
should be made at times of liquidity availability (6). 
 
Regular small pay-outs may increase the perceived value of the insurance, 
rather than long periods of the insurance company’s absence (6). 
 
See yearly cycle income and pressure points: 
Jan-March: Outflows due to land preparation and agricultural investments for the first 
season. Cash inflow opportunities through high labour demand. 
April: Hardest time, as stored food is coming to an end. No available harvest and little 
labour demand, so there is no income. 
May-July: First harvest for consumption, no cash inflow yet. Labour demand for harvest. 
Aug-Sep: Selling of first seasons harvest brings first major inflows of the year. Outflow 
demand for paying debts, school fees and next seasons investment. 
Nov-Dec: Money available from harvest of second seasons cash crops. Outflow demand 
for school fees and Christmas. 




Most savings groups end their cycle and distribute their savings in November-February. 
(FGD with savings groups) 
 
Andrews and Charlses plan their agricultural investments in November to February for the 






Complementarity between informal risk sharing and index insurance 
should be promoted (11, 24). Working with informal risk-sharing groups 
can be a successful strategy for this, possibly also enhancing trust into the 
product (11, 24). 
 
Dichotomous WTP study reveals that insurance offered to groups seems to 
increase demand among individuals who would presumably face higher 
transaction costs in accessing insurance (women and the less educated), 
provided that trust in the other members of the group is high enough (25). 
 
Deserves special attention due to its possible contribution to reducing 
basis risk (10, 11, 18, 19). 
 
Portfolio sales are less expensive than retail index insurance sold to 
individuals through reduction in transaction costs (10). 
61% of survey respondents’ households are part of at least one savings group, and the 
same state to turn to it for financial help. (household survey) 
 
Yet, respondents reported the problem of insufficient money available for giving a loan to 
each member applying for one, particularly at times all members are occurring financial 
hardship. (SD PIs and FGD with savings groups) 
 
Savings groups generally have a size of 30-50 members, and collect regular savings 
ranging from 500-10.000/week. A certain part of the population seems unable to be part 
of savings groups, as they cannot afford membership fees and regular savings. (SD PIs and 
FGD with savings groups) 
 
Amongst some farmers there seems to be certain mistrust into savings groups, some 
reporting of negative experiences having lost their savings through mismanagement or 





Case studies (ACRE and India’s National Agricultural Insurance Scheme) 
show that bundling increases the appeal of insurance (1, 13). 
 
The bundling model should include services that directly translate into 
increased income (e.g. market access) (14). 
 
Different bundling options will appeal differently to different farmers (e.g. 
84% of respondents used improved maize seeds in 2017. Only 29% of respondents used 
fertiliser for maize during 2017, whilst 64% used pesticides. 26% reported to have used a 
loan for growing maize in the first season of 2017. (Household survey) 
 
Andrews can easily purchase improved seeds, fertiliser, pesticides and other inputs from 
their own income, but can also easily access financial loans. 
Betties cannot afford improved seeds, pesticides, or fertiliser and have no access to 
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credit to commercial farmers, but not subsistence farmers) (3). 
 
Bundling with products or services that reduce other agricultural risks can 
reduce basis risk (20, 21, 26). 
financial loans. 
 
People seem used to making orders in form of lists for purchasing inputs. (Andrews report 
to form ‘delivery groups’, delegating one farmer to buy inputs from an input-dealer in 
Mbale, the cotton agent’s work is facilitated through farmers groups making orders, 
friendship groups are often based on the benefitting member to ‘order’ a number of 
items). (SD PIs, field workshops on crop value chains and FGD on crop decision making) 
Some people reported difficulties of the cotton ginneries failing to deliver inputs on time. 
(Key informant interview) 
Sources:  
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(2) Barnett, B. J., and Mahul, O., 2007. Weather index insurance for agriculture and rural areas in lower-income countries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89 (5), 1241-1247.  
(3) Binswanger-Mkhize, H.P., 2012. Is there too much hype about index-based agricultural insurance? The Journal of Development Studies, 48 (2), 187-200.  
(4) Cai, J., De Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E., 2014. A randomized evaluation of the effects of an agricultural insurance program on rural households’ behavior: Evidence from China. 3ie Impact Evaluation Report 
Series. Impact Report 19. 
(5) Cai, J., De Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E., 2015. Social networks and the decision to insure. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(2), 81-108.   
(6) Carter, M. De Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., and Sarris, A., 2014. Index-based weather insurance for developing countries: A review of evidence and a set of propositions for up-scaling (No.P111).  
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Code 1. STATA code for D-optimal design – Stage 6 
*** 
matrix levmat = 4,3,3,4,2 
genfact, levels(levmat) 
list, separator(4) 
rename x1 risk_coverage 
rename x2 premium_payment_timing 
rename x3 payout_channel 
rename x4 bundling 
rename x5 insurance_unit 
matrix b = 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 
dcreate i.risk_coverage i.premium_payment_timing i.payout_channel i.bundling i.insurance_unit, nalt(2) 
nset(12) bmat(b) 
list, separator(4) abbreviate(24) 
 
***End of code*** 
 




Table 2. DCE Workshop Outline – Stage 6 
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Table 3. DCE script – Stage 6 
Intro: Suppose a company is offering you a Weather Insurance for growing maize during the first season in reality. 
You are indeed interested, because they want to sell it to you at a premium you can afford and are happy to pay. 
They offer the insurance in various ways. I'm going to show you two cards that show you two ways in which 
weather insurance is offered. Could you tell me which you prefer? 
1 a 
 
Under this arrangement, you pay for insurance as an individual, and if there is a 
drought, the insurance company pays you directly as an individual. 
1 b 
 
Under this arrangement, you pay for insurance as a member of a savings group, if 
you belong to one. Each member within the group pays for insurance through the 
group and if there is kumumu, the insurance company pays the money to the group 
(and not to you directly). The group then decides how the money should be shared 
among the members. 
2 a  You only buy the insurance. 
(In case people ask: The insurance company sets different prices a farmer can pay for 
the insurance (premiums), and how much the company would pay them in case 
there was kumumu. It is up to the farmer to decide what premium they want to pay 
well knowing how much they would get from the insurance company in case there 
was kumumu.) 
2 b  Under this arrangement, when you buy genuine maize seed, you also pay for 
insurance. You don’t pay for insurance separately, as the cost of insurance is 
included in the price of maize seed. 
2 c 
 
Under this arrangement, when you buy pesticides ad genuine maize seed, you also 
pay for insurance. You don’t pay for insurance separately, as the cost of insurance is 
included in the price of pesticides and maize seed. 
2 d 
 
Under this arrangement, you get a loan from the bank and with this loan; you can 
pay for pesticides and genuine maize seed. You don’t pay for insurance separately as 
the cost of insurance is included in the loan. In case of kumumu, the bank can help 
you pay part of the loan, or all of it. 
3 a 
 
Under this arrangement, you pay insurance only for the germination stage of maize 
during the first season. Only if there is a drought, or the rain is not enough during 
the germination stage, the insurance will pay you. The money you pay for insurance 
for the germination stage is lower than if you were to pay for the whole season. 
3 b 
 
Under this arrangement, you pay insurance only for the stage when maize has 
started growing(khutiya). Only if there is drought, or the rain is not enough during 
the growth stage, the insurance will pay you. The money you pay for insurance for 
the growth stage is lower than if you were to pay for the whole season. 
3 c  Under this arrangement, you pay insurance only for the flowering stage of maize 
during the first season. Only if there is drought, or the rain is not enough during the 
flowering stage, the insurance will pay you. The money you pay for insurance for the 
flowering stage is lower than if you were to pay for the whole season. 
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Image 13. Archetype cards presented as part of the post-DCE questionnaire (from left to right: 1. Andrews 2. 




Under this arrangement, you pay insurance for all the stages of maize growth during 
the first season. That means you pay for germination, plant growth and flowering. 
Should there be a drought, or not enough rainfall at any of these stages during the 
season, the insurance company pays you. Because you are paying for the whole 
season, the price you pay is relatively higher. 
4 a  Under this arrangement, the insurance company fixes August and September as the 
months within which you should pay for insurance. It is up to you to decide if you 
want to pay in August or September. 
4 b  Under this arrangement, the insurance company fixes November and December as 
the months within which you can pay for insurance. It is up to you to decide if you 
want to pay in November or December. 
4 c 
 
 Under this arrangement, the insurance company fixes January and February as the 
months within which you can pay for insurance. It is up to you to decide if you want 
to pay in January or February. 
5 a  
 
Under this arrangement, if there is a drought in Bwikhonge and the insurance 
company wants to pay you, they send the money to their agent who is from your 
community. This agent then delivers the money to you. 
5 b 
 
Under this arrangement, if there is a drought in Bwikhonge and the insurance 




Under this arrangement, if there is a drought in Bwikhonge and the insurance 
company wants to pay you, they send the money to a dealer in agro-inputs who’s 
located near you. You then have to pick the money from the shop of this agro-input 
dealer. 
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